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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2024-02-08 Council Work Session Agenda PacketCouncil Work Session Agenda February 8, 2024 – 5:30 pm 1.Call to Order / Roll Call 2.LPR Cameras* 3.Unscheduled Items 4.Adjournment *Includes Materials - Materials relating to these agenda items can be found in the house agenda packet book located by the Council Chambers entrance, or online at the City’s website at www.corcoranmn.gov. HYBRID MEETING OPTION AVAILABLE The public is invited to attend the regular Council meetings at City Hall. Meeting Via Telephone/Other Electronic Means Call-in I+1 312 626 6799nstructio nsUS: Enter Meeting ID: 893 9035 3069 Video Link and Instructions: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89390353069 or visit http://www.zoom.us and enter Meeting ID: 893 9035 3069 *Please note in-person comments will be taken at the scheduled meeting where noted. Comments received via email to City Clerk Friedrich at mfriedrich@corcoranmn.gov or via public comment cards will also be accepted. All email and public comment cards must be received by the Wednesday prior to scheduled Council meeting. For more information on options to provide public comment visit: www.corcoranmn.gov 1 8200 County Road 116  Corcoran, MN 55340 763-420-2288  www.corcoranmn.gov MEMO Meeting Date: February 8, 2024 To: City Council From: Peter Ekenberg, Sergeant Tim Spellacy, Detective Re: ALPR ____________________________________________________________________ In 2023 the council identified a goal to deploy automatic license plate readers (ALPR) for use by Police/Public Safety. The council reaffirmed the goal in 2024 while staff was conducting research into ALPR cameras. ALPR cameras read license plates in real time and alerts directly to officers that are working. These alerts could be for stolen vehicles, registered owners with warrants, revoked driver’s license status, attempt to locate, Amber alerts, and more. Staff met with vendors, attended demonstrations, and met with neighboring agencies who currently use ALPR cameras. While researching vendors, staff reviewed features such as security of the information obtained by ALPR cameras, leasing versus buying ALPR cameras, IT related issues with set up and use of the cameras, and the remote nature of where some of the cameras would be located. Staff also learned that some vendors sell information acquired by ALPR cameras , which was not desirable. Staff identified nine potential locations to deploy ALPR cameras for the initial deployment. The proposed locations are: 1.Co Rd 30 near Co Rd 101 – Westbound traffic 2.Co Rd 10 near Brockton – Westbound traffic 3.Co Rd 116 near Hackamore Rd – Northbound traffic 4.Co Rd 116 near Co Rd 117 - Southbound traffic 5.Co Rd 50 near Co Rd 19 - Eastbound traffic 6.Co Rd 30 near Co Rd 19 - Eastbound traffic 7.Co Rd 19 near St Hwy 55 - Northbound traffic Revised Agenda Item: 2. 2 Staff wanted the ability to extend the ALPR network by allowing HOA’s or private businesses to deploy their own ALPR cameras with the option to integrate police department access. Staff determined that leasing cameras would be the most beneficial as it would not require costly IT involvement and maintenance. Additionally, the vendor would be responsible for updating the hardware. Based on the needs that were outlined, staff identified Flock Safey as the vendor that could best meet all of the concerns and requirements staff identified. The Flock program is being utilized by more than 32 agencies in Minnesota, including Medina, Maple Grove, West Hennepin, and Plymouth. Flock charges an annual flat rate lease per camera of $3,000 per camera, which is wireless, free of infrastructure setup, and has the option for solar or direct power. The y also include a warranty, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) compliant cloud - based hosting, unlimited user licenses, ongoing software enhancements, camera setup, mounting, shipping, handling and a cellular connection. The Flock lease program prevents the city from being burdened with maintaining costly equipment at the end of the agreement, which could require replacement. Financial/Budget: Each camera is $3,000 a year with a set-up fee of $150 (city pole) or $650 (installed by Flock). Staff is recommending that the first two years’ cost be paid using the State of Minnesota’s Public Safety money that was disbursed to cities on December 26, 2023. If private entities elect to allow police department access to their information, there is no additional charge. If Council elects to proceed, staff will incorporate council feedback into the policy and camera locations. Staff will bring final policy and hardware information to council for final approval. Attachments a.Staff slide show b.Flock information FAQ c.Flock Privacy and Ethics d.Minnesota State Statute 13.824 e.Sample Policy ALPR Orono f.Sample Policy Robbinsdale g.Sample Policy Rochester h.Flock Reduce Crime document i.Sample Policy West Hennepin Public Safety j.Added: Plate Camera Letter from Planning Commissioner Brummond k.Added: Plate Camera Letter from Planning Chair Lanterman 8.Co Rd 19 near Co Rd 117 – Southbound Traffic 9.Co Rd 10 near Co Rd 19 – Eastbound traffic 1 8200 County Road 116  Corcoran, MN 55340 763-420-2288  www.corcoranmn.gov MEMO Meeting Date: February 8, 2024 To: City Council From: Peter Ekenberg, Sergeant Tim Spellacy, Detective Re: ALPR ____________________________________________________________________ In 2023 the council identified a goal to deploy automatic license plate readers (ALPR) for use by Police/Public Safety. The council reaffirmed the goal in 2024 while staff was conducting research into ALPR cameras. ALPR cameras read license plates in real time and alerts directly to officers that are working. These alerts could be for stolen vehicles, registered owners with warrants, revoked driver’s license status, attempt to locate, Amber alerts, and more. Staff met with vendors, attended demonstrations, and met with neighboring agencies who currently use ALPR cameras. While researching vendors, staff reviewed features such as security of the information obtained by ALPR cameras, leasing versus buying ALPR cameras, IT related issues with set up and use of the cameras, and the remote nature of where some of the cameras would be located. Staff also learned that some vendors sell information acquired by ALPR cameras, which was not desirable. Staff identified nine potential locations to deploy ALPR cameras for the initial deployment. The proposed locations are: 1.Co Rd 30 near Co Rd 101 – Westbound traffic 2.Co Rd 10 near Brockton – Westbound traffic 3.Co Rd 116 near Hackamore Rd – Northbound traffic 4.Co Rd 116 near Co Rd 117 - Southbound traffic 5.Co Rd 50 near Co Rd 19 - Eastbound traffic 6.Co Rd 30 near Co Rd 19 - Eastbound traffic Agenda Item: 2. 2 Staff wanted the ability to extend the ALPR network by allowing HOA’s or private businesses to deploy their own ALPR cameras with the option to integrate police department access. Staff determined that leasing cameras would be the most beneficial as it would not require costly IT involvement and maintenance. Additionally, the vendor would be responsible for updating the hardware. Based on the needs that were outlined, staff identified Flock Safey as the vendor that could best meet all of the concerns and requirements staff identified. The Flock program is being utilized by more than 32 agencies in Minnesota, including Medina, Maple Grove, West Hennepin, and Plymouth. Flock charges an annual flat rate lease per camera of $3,000 per camera, which is wireless, free of infrastructure setup, and has the option for solar or direct power. The y also include a warranty, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) compliant cloud- based hosting, unlimited user licenses, ongoing software enhancements, camera setup, mounting, shipping, handling and a cellular connection. The Flock lease program prevents the city from being burdened with maintaining costly equipment at the end of the agreement, which could require replacement. Financial/Budget: Each camera is $3,000 a year with a set-up fee of $150 (city pole) or $650 (installed by Flock). Staff is recommending that the first two years’ cost be paid using the State of Minnesota’s Public Safety money that was disbursed to cities on December 26, 2023. If private entities elect to allow police department access to their information, there is no additional charge. If Council elects to proceed, staff will incorporate council feedback into the policy and camera locations. Staff will bring final policy and hardware information to council for final approval. Attachments a.Automatic license place reader memo b.Staff slide show c.Flock information FAQ d.Flock Privacy and Ethics e.Minnesota State Statute 13.824 f.Sample Policy ALPR Orono g.Sample Policy Robbinsdale h.Sample Policy Rochester i.Flock Reduce Crime document j.Sample Policy West Hennepin Public Safety 7.Co Rd 19 near St Hwy 55 - Northbound traffic 8.Co Rd 19 near Co Rd 117 – Southbound Traff 9.Co Rd 10 near Co Rd 19 – Eastbound traffic CITY OF CORCORAN ALPR CAMERAS SERGEANT PETER EKENBERG DETECTIVE TIM SPELLACY FLOCK COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT MANAGER KRISTEN MACLEOD Attachment Item: 2a. SUMMARY •IN 2023 THE COUNCIL IDENTIFIED GOALS FOR THE YEAR. ROADSIDE AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR) WERE ONE OF THE ITEMS DISCUSSED IN THE HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORY •IN 2024 COUNCIL REAFFIRMED THAT GOAL •STAFF CONDUCTED RESEARCH, ATTENDED DEMONSTRATIONS, AND MET WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS USING ALPR TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS •BASED ON FEEDBACK FROM THE COUNCIL AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS, STAFF PRIORITIZED SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT APPROPRIATELY INTEGRATES SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PROTECTION AND PRIVACY OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS •STAFF REVIEWED SEVERAL COMPANIES AND IDENTIFIED FLOCK SAFETY AS A PREFERRED VENDOR FOR OUR NEEDS GOALS •CREATE A NETWORK OF ALPR CAMERAS AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY •CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATION BY HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES •IMPLEMENT POLICIES TO PROTECT INFORMATION OBTAINED BY ALPR CAMERAS •PREVENT CRIME BEFORE IT CAN OCCUR •SOLVE CRIMES MORE EFFICIENTLY APPLICATIONS FOR ALPR CAMERAS •ALPR CAMERAS CAN BE USED TO HELP IDENTIFY STOLEN VEHICLES, MISSING PEOPLE, AMBER ALERTS, AND REVOKED DRIVERS TRAVELING INTO CORCORAN. •TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND PATTERNS •ALPR CAN AID IN INVESTIGATION INTO CRIMES •GOLF COURSE THEFTS •CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS •STOLEN VEHICLE IN RAVINIA •CONSTRUCTION SITE THEFTS •BUSINESS DISTRICT THEFTS PROPOSED LOCATIONS 1.CO RD 30 NEAR CO RD 101 –WESTBOUND TRAFFIC2.CO RD 10 NEAR BROCKTON –WESTBOUND TRAFFIC3.CO RD 116 NEAR HACKAMORE RD –NORTHBOUND TRAFFIC4.CO RD 116 NEAR CO RD 117 -SOUTHBOUND TRAFFIC5.CO RD 50 NEAR CO RD 19 -EASTBOUND TRAFFIC6.CO RD 30 NEAR CO RD 19 -EASTBOUND TRAFFIC7.CO RD 19 NEAR ST HWY 55 -NORTHBOUND TRAFFIC8.CO RD 19 NEAR CO RD 117 –SOUTHBOUND TRAFFIC9.CO RD 10 NEAR CO RD 19 –EASTBOUND TRAFFIC COST •LEASE PROGRAM -$3,000 A YEAR / CAMERA WITH 650.00 SETUP FEE. •1 YEAR/2 YEAR OPTION, CAN INCREASE OR DECREASE CAMERAS. •PUBLIC SAFETY GRANT MONEY CAN BE USED FOR INITIAL SET-UP AND FIRST YEARS. SUCCESS STORIES •WEST HENNEPIN PUBLIC SAFETY REPORTED THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE MANY DRIVERS WHO ARE SUSPENDED, REVOKED, ETC.HAVE LOCATED SEVERAL STOLEN CARS/PLATES. THEY ALSO USE THE INFORMATION SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK FOR INVESTIGATIONS. MOST RECENTLY, A BUSINESS IN A NEARBY CITY WAS BURGLARIZED. THEY PROVIDED A LIST OF CARS THAT WERE LEAVING THE AREA AROUND THE TIME OF THE BURGLARY. •ORONO POLICE PROVIDED A RECENT INVESTIGATION THAT LED TO A STOLEN TRAILER BEING LOCATED. ALONG WITH THE TRAILER, OVER $25,000 IN STOLEN PROPERTY WAS ALSO RECOVERED WITH MORE STILL COMING. FLOCK IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES •FLOCK SAFETY IS RAPIDLY GROWING IN MINNESOTA AGENCIES •NEARBY AGENCIES RECENTLY USING FLOCK •ROGERS POLICE, MAPLE GROVE POLICE, PLYMOUTH POLICE, MEDINA POLICE, AND WEST HENNEPIN PUBLIC SAFETY •BY CHOOSING FLOCK, WE JOIN WITH ALL OTHER FLOCK AGENCIES INCREASING OUR INVESTIGATIVE SCOPE CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATION BY HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES FLOCK SAFETY •LEASED CAMERAS •WILL SET-UP AND MAINTAIN CAMERAS •PROCESS FOR COMPANIES/ HOA’S TO GET ALPRS WE CAN ACCESS (WITH PERMISSION) •REAL-TIME ALERTS •CAN INTEGRATE WITH OTHER CITES SYSTEM •SECURE SYSTEM •DOES NOT SELL INFORMATION INFORMATION FROM FLOCK +Corcoran, MN Eliminate crime and shape a safer future, together. Why Flock Safety? What we observe:the current reality ●Limited Police Resources ●Crime is on the rise ●Trust is needed more than ever What we believe:the opportunity ●Technology multiplies the force ●Capture and distribute objective evidence to the right user ●Engage community to support and grow How does the technology work? When you get Flock you get: Flock Safety provides your police department with indiscriminate evidence from fixed locations. We provide all of the maintenance so that your police department and city staff can focus on keeping your city safe and prosperous. INFRASTRUCTURE-FREE Reduce time to value and utility costs with full-service deployment. 24/7 COVERAGE Capture objective vehicle data around the clock to multiply your force. REAL-TIME ALERTS • NCIC • NCMEC (Amber Alert) • Custom Hot Lists Ethically Made • No people • No facial recognition • No traffic enforcement • Indiscriminate evidence What this IS What this is NOT ●License plate recognition ●Gathers objective evidence and facts about vehicles, not people ●Alerts police of wanted vehicles ●Used to solve crime ●Adheres to all state laws ●Not facial recognition ●Not tied to Personal Identifiable Information ●Not used for traffic enforcement ●Data not stored beyond 30 days → automatically deletes every 30 days Proactive: Real time Alerts when stolen or wanted vehicles enter your city Investigative: As clearance Rates increase, crime rates decrease Flock cameras serve as a deterrent How does this technology prevent and eliminate crime? [ Replace image] Mitigating Risk Protecting Privacy ●Footage owned by Agency/City and will never by sold or shared by Flock ●30 day data retention, then deleted ●Short retention period ensures that all data not associated with a crime is automatically deleted & unrecoverable ●Takes human bias out of crime-solving by detecting objective data, and detecting events that are objectively illegal (ex. Stolen vehicles) ●All data is stored securely in the AWS Cloud, and end to end encryption of all data ●Search reason is required for audit trail ●NOT facial recognition software ●NOT predictive policing ●NO PII is contained in Flock ●NOT used for traffic enforcement ●Not connected to registration data or 3rd party databases (Carfax, DMV) ●Transparency Portal (optional) Transparency + Insights Measure ROI and promote the ethical use of public safety technology Transparency Portal ●Customizable for each agency ●Display technology policies ●Publish usage metrics ●Share downloadable Search audits Insights Dashboard ●Measure crime patterns and ROI ●Audit Search history Examples ●Click here for Morgan Hill PD ●Click here for Vallejo PD Already solving and preventing crime Orono PD West Hennepin DPS Wayzata PD Coon Rapids PD Roseville PD St. Louis Park PD Minnetonka PD Edina PD Champlin PD Plymouth PD S. Lake Minnetonka PD Robbinsdale PD Hopkins PD Ramsey Co SO Richfield PD Flock Safety In Minnesota Plus, many more commercial and private customers Anoka County SO Anoka PD Hudson (WI) PD Woodbury PD St. Mary’s Point University of Minnesota PD Maple Grove PD St. Louis County SO Three Rivers Park Dist. Public Safety Brooklyn Center PD Paul Bunyan Task Force Belle Plaine PD Fridley PD Mounds View PD Sartell PD Fairbault PD Blaine PD Medina PD Willmar PD ➔Armed robbery: West Allis officers received an alert that a Kia SUV wanted in connection with an armed robbery in Milwaukee was in the area. Officers initiated a traffic stop but the suspects fled, kicking off a high-speed pursuit that ended in a crash. The three suspects, two of whom had several felony warrants, were arrested. ➔Homicide: Another alert on a stolen Hyundai sedan came in connection to a Milwaukee homicide. Officers quickly responded but the suspects fled. The chase concluded in Milwaukee where the suspects were arrested. Solving Violent Crimes in Wisconsin West Allis PD - West Allis, WI A Grafton crime analyst entered the missing Town of Brookfield senior’s vehicle into the Flock system and saw it had been in their city. Silver Alert Issued Missing, Endangered Senior Found in 15 Minutes The vehicle passed a Flock LPR camera in Port Washington and an alert is immediately sent to local officers. Within an hour of the plate being entered in Flock, the car was located and the individual reunited with their family. Senior Returned Vehicle Sets Off Alert Port Washington PD - Port Washington, WI 2:43 p.m. 2:43 p.m. Case Study: Smash and Grab Robbery ●January 2022 - Five suspects attempt a Smash & Grab at a Jewelry store but are chased off by the owner ●But here’s what didn’t make the news… ●Suspect vehicle identified using Flock ●SBPD thought the suspects would try again, potentially more violently ●Vehicle placed on a custom hotlist ●SBPD receives a real time alert that the suspects are returning ●Officers locate the vehicle within seconds preventing another attempt San Bruno, CASan Bruno, PD San Bruno jewelry store owner stops attempted smash-and-grab robbery - ABC 7 News - Bay Area Amber Alert Issued 12:33 PM When Every Second Matters: Child Abduction Search Conducted with Flock Safety Suspect Vehicle Located 2:30 PM 1:01 PM Chamblee PD - Chamblee, GA Felony Stop + Arrest 5:03 PM Baby Reunited with Mother 6:00 PM Stranger on Stranger Abduction August 28, 2020 QUESTIONS AND FEEDBACK About Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) The Problem: Violent Crime Is Not Going Away Nationwide, cities are experiencing a disturbing rise in homicides and violence. The FBI’s 2020 Crime Report shows a 30% increase in homicides from 2019 to 2020, the largest single-year increase recorded. Over two-thirds of the country's most populous cities saw even more homicides in 2021. Proactive - ALPR devices provide real-time alerts when a vehicle that is stolen or associated with a known suspect is detected. Investigative - ALPR cameras help determine whether and which vehicle(s) were at the scene of a crime. One Solution: Technology that Detects Objective Evidence to Clear More Cases Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) capture computer-readable images of license plates and vehicles, allowing officers to compare plate numbers against those of stolen cars or wanted individuals on a crime database like the NCIC. ALPR devices assist law enforcement in solving crime in two ways: Is ALPR effective ? According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, when employed ethically and objectively, ALPRs are an effective tool for law enforcement, cutting down on the time required for investigations and acting as a force multiplier. In 2011, a study by the Police Executive Research Forum concluded that ALPRs used by the Mesa, Ariz., Police Department resulted in “nearly 3 times as many ‘hits’ for stolen vehicles, and twice as many vehicle recoveries.” Communities with ALPR systems report crime reductions of up to 70 percent. In some areas, that included a 60 percent reduction in non-residential burglaries, 80 percent reduction in residential burglary, and a 40 percent reduction in robberies. Attachment Item: 2b. AMBER Alerts: License plate readers in metro Atlanta were able to find a vehicle containing a kidnapped one-year-old, who had been taken from his mother at random off the street. The child was recovered unharmed. Some ALPR systems integrate directly with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s AMBER Alert system, sending real-time alerts to officers in seconds. [New information released about 1-year-old’s kidnapping] Silver Alerts: Knoxville Police were able to locate a missing elderly man who suffers from dementia after he drove away in a family vehicle. ALPR technology has helped solve hundreds of Silver Alerts across the country. [Missing man with dementia found using Flock camera] Firearm violence: The Las Vegas Trail, a high-crime area in Fort Worth, TX, saw violent crime decrease by 22% in 2021 compared with the first nine months of 2019. Fort Worth Police attributed this drop partially to the license plate reader system implemented in the neighborhood during the same period of time. [Crime is down 22% in Fort Worth’s Las Vegas Trail. How neighbors and police made it safer] Organized theft: Grafton, a growing village with a bustling retail district, is dealing with increased organized retail theft — Two-thirds of all the crimes reported to Grafton police in 2020 were retail thefts. Grafton Police have implemented a license plate reader system to identify vehicles that have been involved in thefts or have been stolen themselves. In one week alone, they recovered three stolen vehicles with drivers planning to engage in retail theft. [Losses mount as retailers fight theft rings, accuse online storefronts of doing little to stop resale of stolen goods] ALPR Provides Objective Evidence While Protecting Privacy ALPR does not include facial recognition capabilities and does not capture personally identifiable information (PII). While eyewitnesses and individual officers are subject to inherent human bias, ALPR cameras capture wholly-objective images of vehicles and license plates, providing a clear and actionable investigative lead. ALPR Use Cases Include: About Flock Safety ALPR Privacy and Ethics Factsheet Flock Safety data and footage is encrypted throughout its entire lifecycle. All data is securely stored with AES256 encryption with our cloud provider, Amazon Web Services. On-device, data is only stored temporarily for a short time until it is uploaded to the cloud, at which point it is removed automatically from the local device. This means the data is secure from when it is on the Flock Safety device to when it is transferred to the cloud, using a secure connection to Flock Safety servers. While stored in the cloud, all data (both footage and metadata) is fully encrypted at rest. Flock Safety defaults to permanently deleting all data after 30 days on a rolling basis, setting a new standard in the industry. Flock Safety’s customers own 100% of their data and determine who has access. Flock Safety will never share or sell the data, per our privacy policy. With explicit written permission from the customer, Flock Safety does have the ability to grant law enforcement access to specific footage for a short period (24 hours, 48 hours, or however long the customer desires) in the event of an investigation following a crime. Access can only be granted through the approval of the customer. Flock Safety has maintenance software in place to measure device performance and image capture quality. This is used to diagnose issues preemptively and schedule service calls in the event of a device malfunction or emergency. How does Flock Safety keep devices and data secure? Flock Safety holds itself to the highest level of security. We have implemented the following security policies and features: Who has access to data collected by Flock Safety devices? Attachment Item: 2c. About Flock Safety ALPR Privacy and Ethics Factsheet Flock Safety stores footage for only 30 days on a rolling basis by default, after which the footage is automatically hard deleted. The only exception to this is if a democratically-elected governing body or official legislates a different data retention period. While searching for footage or other evidence on the Flock Safety platform, law enforcement agencies must enter reason codes to verify the legitimacy of the search and create an audit trail. Authorized users go through training to properly use our system and communicate with their dispatch teams. Flock Safety customers commit not to use the data collected to work with third-party repossession companies, traffic enforcement, revenue collection, unpaid fines, or towing companies. We do not use facial recognition or capture any personally identifiable information such as name, phone number, or address, and we do not work with federal government agencies for immigration enforcement purposes. Flock Safety’s ALPR Transparency Portal, an optional free feature for all law enforcement customers, is the first public-facing dashboard for law enforcement agencies, city leaders, and local government officials to share policies, usage, and public safety outcomes related to ALPR technology. The ALPR Transparency Portal helps promote transparency and accountability in the use of policing technology in order to build community trust while creating a safer, more equitable society. How long does Flock Safety keep data? What features do Flock Safety devices have that enable audits and oversight? Attachment Item: 2d. ORONO POLICE DEPARTMENT “Dedicated to fairness, service, pride and quality” POLICY: 3059.0 EFFECTIVE DATE: July 9, 2020 REVIEW DATE: APPROVED BY: Title: Automated License Plate Recognition System (ALPR) Distribution: Sworn Personnel Purpose: The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance on the access, storage and review of the Automated License Plate Recognition System (ALPR) and the use of data collected by the reader as well as the required system audits in accordance with Minn. Stat. 13.824. 3059.01 Policy: The Orono Police Department recognizes the use of the ALPR as an effective tool to identify vehicles and vehicle owners who are associate with criminal activity and missing and endangered persons. 3059.02 Definitions: Minnesota State Statute 13.824 defines an ALPR as an electronic device mounted on a law enforcement vehicle or positioned in a stationary location that is capable of recording data on, or taking a photograph of, a vehicle or its license plate and comparing the collected data and photographs to existing law enforcement databases for investigative purposes. The law enforcement database is updated by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) twice daily. Automated License Plate Reader includes a device that is owned or operated by a person who is not a government entity to the extent that data collected by the reader are shared with a law enforcement agency. 3059.03 Operator’s Responsibilities: 1.Use of LPR system shall adhere to department policy 4009.0 (Professional Conduct of Officers). 2. Only officers trained in the proper use of the ALPR may operate it with their own unique login. 3.When an officer receives a “Hit” on the ALPR, the system will alert the officer visually and audibly to the match. The officer must acknowledge that the ALPR read the license plate correctly and verify the “Hit” is current by running the information through the state real-time data system via MDC or dispatch. Attachment Item: 2e. ALPR 3059.0 Page 2 4. Prior to taking enforcement action, the officer shall verify that the vehicle description matches that given for the “Hit” vehicle. When a “Hit” is based on the status of the registered owner (i.e., license status, want or warrant) the officer shall also verify that the driver of the vehicle reasonably fits the physical descriptors given for the subject of the “Hit”. 5. Proper department procedures and safe police tactics should be followed when initiating a stop or investigation into a “Hit” vehicle. 6. Any issues / problems with the ALPR system should be reported immediately to the ALPR administrator or a supervisor. 7. Any member who willfully violates Minn. Statute 13.09 through the unauthorized acquisition or use of ALPR data may face discipline up to and including termination of employment as well as possible criminal prosecution. (MN Statute 626.8472) 3059.04 Data Collected by an ALPR Must be Limited to the Following: 1. License plate numbers 2. Date, time and location data on vehicles 3. Pictures of license plates, vehicles and areas surrounding the vehicles 4. Collection of any data not authorized above is prohibited 5. Data collected by an automated license plate reader may only be matched with data in the Minnesota license plate data file, provided that a law enforcement agency may use additional sources of data for matching if the additional data relate to an active criminal investigation. A central state repository of automated license plate reader data is prohibited unless explicitly authorized by law. 6. Automated license plate readers must not be used to monitor or track an individual who is the subject of an active criminal investigation unless authorized by a warrant, issued upon probably cause, or exigent circumstances justify the use without obtaining a warrant. 3059.05 Data Storage: 1. Data collected by an ALPR that are not related to an active criminal investigation must be destroyed no later than 60 days from the date of collection. This allows a sufficient time frame for retrieving data relevant to a violation or criminal investigation. 2. Preservation of data is required upon receipt of a written request from an individual who is the subject of a pending criminal charge or complaint, along with the case or complaint number and statement that the data may be used as exculpatory evidence. This data, otherwise subject to destruction after 60 days, must be preserved until the criminal charge or complaint is resolved or dismissed. ALPR 3059.0 Page 3 3. Destruction of data is required upon written request from a program participant of “Data Protection for Victims of Violence.” ALPR data related to the program participant must be destroyed at the time of collection or upon receipt of the request, whichever occurs later, unless the data is classified as active criminal investigative data. . 3059.06 Authorization to Access Data Shall be Permitted by the Following: 1. The Orono Police Department’s written procedure ensures that law enforcement personnel have access to ALPR data if authorized in writing by the Chief of Police, or his/her designee. This access to data collected by an ALPR must be for a legitimate, specified and documented law enforcement purpose. 2. Access to this ALPR data must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the data is pertinent to an active criminal investigation and must include a record of the factual basis for the access and any associated case number, complaint or incident that is the basis for the access. 3. The ability of authorized individuals to enter, update or access ALPR data must be limited through the use of role-based access that corresponds to the official duties or training level of the individual and the statutory authorization that grants access for that purpose. All queries, responses and all actions in which data is entered, updated, accessed, shared or disseminated must be recorded in a data audit trail or log. 3059.07 Sharing of Information Among Law Enforcement Agencies: 1. Historical data records date, time, license plate number, GPS location, squad and camera information for each read. Historical data is only searchable for legitimate law enforcement purposes, outlined in above paragraph 3059.06 2. Outside law enforcement requests for historical data shall be routed to the Chief of Police or his/her designee. 3. ALPR data is classified as private, with specific exceptions per Minn. Stat. 13.821. 4. If data collected by an ALPR are shared with another law enforcement agency under this subdivision, the agency that received the data must comply with all data classification, destruction and security requirements. 5. ALPR data that are not related to an active criminal investigation may not be shared with, disseminated to, sold to or traded with any other individual or entity unless explicitly authorized by state statute. ALPR 3059.0 Page 4 3059.08 Log of Use 1. Log of use is required to record specific times of day the reader actively collected data. 2. Log of use is required to record the aggregate number of vehicles or license plates on which data are collected for each period of active use, and a list of all state and federal databases with which the data were compared, unless the existence of the database itself is not public. 3. Log of use is required to record the number of vehicles or license plates where data identifies a vehicle or license plate that has been stolen, a warrant for the arrest of the owner of the vehicle or an owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license or similar category, or are active investigative data. 4. Log of use is required to record an ALPR at a stationary or fixed location, the location at which the ALPR actively collected data and is installed and used. 5. A list of the current and previous locations, including dates at those locations, of any fixed ALPR or other surveillance device with ALPR capability, must be maintained. This list must be accessible to the public, unless it is determined that the data is security information. 3059.09 Manual Hot List Content and Use: 1. The ALPR is capable of alerting to license plates entered by the law enforcement agency in the ALPR system and not listed in the Minnesota License Plate Data File. Entries into the ALPR system shall comply with the following procedures and Minn. Stat. 13.824: a. A license plate number or partial license plate number shall only be entered in the Orono Police Department’s Manual Hot List when there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason related to an active criminal investigation to identify or locate that particular vehicle or any person reasonably associated with that vehicle. b. Manual Hot List entries may only be made or edited by an ALPR administrator or supervisor. c. A Manual Hot List entry shall be removed as soon as practicable if there is no longer a justification for the entry. d. If an officer receives an alert based on a Manual Hot List entry, they must follow 3059.03 and confirm that current legal justification exists to take action on the alert. e. A Manual Hot List entry may not be used as a substitute for an entry into any other databases such as Minnesota or FBI Hot Files, Nation Crime Information Center (NCIC), or Keeping Our Police Safe (KOPS) files, if appropriate. ALPR 3059.0 Page 5 3059.10 Biennial Audit 1. It is required that records showing the date and time ALPR data was collected and the applicable classification of the data be maintained. An independent biennial audit of the records is required to determine whether data currently in the records is classified, how the data is used, whether they are destroyed as required and to verify compliance with the law. 2. A report summarizing the results of each audit must be provided to the Commissioner of Administration, to the chair and ranking minority member of the committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over data practices and public safety issues and to the Legislative Commission on Data Practices and Personal Data Privacy, no later than 30 days following completion of the audit. 3059.11 Data Requests: 1. Orono Police Department ALPR data that has been collected is classified as private unless access is permitted by law. Citizens can contact the Orono Police Department Records Department to obtain ALPR data on their registered vehicles. This request is reviewed by the Records Manager to ensure that it is consistent with the ALPR Statute 13.824 and Minnesota Data Practices Act, Minnesota Statues, Chapter 13. 3059.12 Notification to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension: 1. Within 10 days of the installation or current use of an ALPR, or the integration of ALPR technology into another surveillance device, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension must be notified of that installation, or use and any fixed location of a stationary ALPR. *********** Policy 427 Robbinsdale Police Department Policy Manual Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/11, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Robbinsdale Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 1 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) 427.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). 427.2 POLICY The policy of the Robbinsdale Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review. 427.3 ADMINISTRATION The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Robbinsdale Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery. All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Administration Captain. The Administration Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. 427.4 OPERATIONS Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose. (a)An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b)An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not necessary before using an ALPR. (c)While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training. (e) No ALPR operator may access confidential department, state or federal data unless authorized to do so. Attachment Item: 2f. Robbinsdale Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/11, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Robbinsdale Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 2 (f)If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the Minnesota Justice Information Services (MNJIS) and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) databases before taking enforcement action that is based solely upon an ALPR alert. 427.4.1 RESTRICTIONS, NOTIFICATIONS AND AUDITS The Robbinsdale Police Department will observe the following guidelines regarding ALPR use (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Data collected by an ALPR will be limited to: 1.License plate numbers. 2.Date, time and location of data captured. 3.Pictures of license plates, vehicles and areas surrounding the vehicle captured. (b)ALPR data may only be matched with the Minnesota license plate data file, unless additional sources are needed for an active criminal investigation. (c)ALPRs shall not be used to monitor or track an individual unless done so under a search warrant or because of exigent circumstances. (d)The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shall be notified within 10 days of any installation or use and of any fixed location of an ALPR. 427.5 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION The Administration Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles and pole- mounted ALPRs to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. ALPR data received from another agency shall be maintained securely and released in the same manner as ALPR data collected by this department (Minn. Stat. § 13.824). ALPR data not related to an active criminal investigation must be destroyed no later than 60 days from the date of collection with the following exceptions (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Exculpatory evidence - Data must be retained until a criminal matter is resolved if a written request is made from a person who is the subject of a criminal investigation asserting that ALPR data may be used as exculpatory evidence. (b)Address Confidentiality Program - Data related to a participant of the Address Confidentiality Program must be destroyed upon the written request of the participant. ALPR data already collected at the time of the request shall be destroyed and future related ALPR data must be destroyed at the time of collection. Destruction can be deferred if it relates to an active criminal investigation. All other ALPR data should be retained in accordance with the established records retention schedule. 427.5.1 LOG OF USE A public log of ALPR use will be maintained that includes (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): Robbinsdale Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/11, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Robbinsdale Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 3 (a)Specific times of day that the ALPR collected data. (b)The aggregate number of vehicles or license plates on which data are collected for each period of active use and a list of all state and federal public databases with which the data were compared. (c)For each period of active use, the number of vehicles or license plates related to: 1.A vehicle or license plate that has been stolen. 2.A warrant for the arrest of the owner of the vehicle. 3.An owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license or similar category. 4.Active investigative data. (d)For an ALPR at a stationary or fixed location, the location at which the ALPR actively collected data and is installed and used. A publicly accessible list of the current and previous locations, including dates at those locations, of any fixed ALPR or other surveillance devices with ALPR capability shall be maintained. The list may be kept from the public if the data is security information as provided in Minn. Stat. § 13.37, Subd. 2. 427.6 ACCOUNTABILITY All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Robbinsdale Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Minn. Stat. § 13.824; Minn. Stat. § 13.05): (a)All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time. (b)Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action. (c)Biennial audits and reports shall be completed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 13.824, Subd. 6. (d)Breaches of personal data are addressed as set forth in the Protected Information Policy (Minn. Stat. § 13.055). (e)All queries and responses, and all actions, in which data are entered, updated, accessed, shared or disseminated, must be recorded in a data audit trail. (f)Any member who violates Minn. Stat. § 13.09 through the unauthorized acquisition or use of ALPR data will face discipline and possible criminal prosecution (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). Robbinsdale Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/11, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Robbinsdale Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 4 427.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes: 1.The name of the agency. 2.The name of the person requesting. 3.The intended purpose of obtaining the information. 4.A record of the factual basis for the access and any associated case number, complaint or incident that is the basis for the access. 5.A statement that the request is authorized by the head of the requesting law enforcement agency or his/her designee. (b)The request is reviewed by the Administration Captain or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled. 1.A release must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the data is pertinent to an active criminal investigation. (c)The approved request is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy. Policy 427 Rochester Police Department Policy Manual Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 1 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) 427.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). 427.2 POLICY The policy of the Rochester Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review. 427.3 ADMINISTRATION The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Rochester Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery. All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Services Captain in coordination with the Intelligence and Crime Analysis Unit (Intel).The Intel Lieutenant will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. System administrators shall: (a) Provide or oversee the training of all officers and civilian employees who are authorized to operate an ALPR or to access or use ALPR stored data. (b) Review and approve requests to access and use stored ALPR data. (c) Ensure compliance with this directive and all state and federal laws. 427.4 OPERATIONS Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose. (a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business and in accordance with the law. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not necessary before using an ALPR. Attachment Item: 2g. Rochester Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 2 (c)An ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around major crime scenes or an area of repeated minor offenses. Captured data can be analyzed and utilized in any active criminal investigation. (d)No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training. (e)No ALPR operator may access confidential department, state or federal data unless authorized to do so. (f)An officer shall verify an ALPR response through the Minnesota Justice Information Services (MNJIS) and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) databases before taking enforcement action that is based solely upon an ALPR alert. 427.4.1 RESTRICTIONS, NOTIFICATIONS AND AUDITS The Rochester Police Department will observe the following guidelines regarding ALPR use (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Data collected by an ALPR will be limited to: 1.License plate numbers. 2.Date, time and location of data captured. 3.Pictures of license plates, vehicles and areas surrounding the vehicle captured. (b)ALPR data may only be matched with the Minnesota license plate data file, unless additional sources are needed for an active criminal investigation. (c)ALPRs shall not be used to monitor or track an individual unless done so under a search warrant or because of exigent circumstances. (d)The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shall be notified within 10 days of any installation or use and of any fixed location of an ALPR. 427.5 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION The Services Captain, in conjunction with the Intelligence and Crime Analysis (Intel) Lieutenant, are responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. ALPR data received from another agency shall be maintained securely and released in the same manner as ALPR data collected by this department (Minn. Stat. § 13.824). ALPR data not related to an active criminal investigation must be destroyed no later than 60 days from the date of collection with the following exceptions (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Exculpatory evidence - Data must be retained until a criminal matter is resolved if a written request is made from a person who is the subject of a criminal investigation asserting that ALPR data may be used as exculpatory evidence. (b)Address Confidentiality Program - Data related to a participant of the Address Confidentiality Program, such as the Safe at Home program, must be destroyed upon Rochester Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 3 the written request of the participant. ALPR data already collected at the time of the request shall be destroyed and future related ALPR data must be destroyed at the time of collection. Destruction can be deferred if it relates to an active criminal investigation. All other ALPR data should be retained in accordance with the established records retention schedule. 427.5.1 LOG OF USE A public log of ALPR use will be maintained that includes (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Specific times of day that the ALPR collected data. (b)The aggregate number of vehicles or license plates on which data are collected for each period of active use and a list of all state and federal public databases with which the data were compared. (c)For each period of active use, the number of vehicles or license plates related to: 1.A vehicle or license plate that has been stolen. 2.A warrant for the arrest of the owner of the vehicle. 3.An owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license or similar category. 4.Active investigative data. (d)For an ALPR at a stationary or fixed location, the location at which the ALPR actively collected data and is installed and used. A publicly accessible list of the current and previous locations, including dates at those locations, of any fixed ALPR or other surveillance devices with ALPR capability shall be maintained. The list may be kept from the public if the data is security information as provided in Minn. Stat. § 13.37, Subd. 2. 427.5.2 ALPR HOTLISTS A hotlist record may be created when a determination is made by the Rochester Police Department or another law enforcement agency there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement purpose to identify or locate a particular vehicle related to an active criminal investigation. For purpose of the ALPR, a Hot list may be maintained that consists of a compilation of one or more license plates, or partial license plates, of a vehicle or vehicles for which a BOLO situation exists. A Hotlist may be programed into an ALPR so that the device will alert if it captures the image of a license plate that matches a BOLO list entry. Hotlists shall only be comprised of license plates that are associated with specific vehicles or persons for which or whom there is a legitimate and documented law enforcement reason to identify and locate, or for which there is a legitimate and documented law enforcement reason to determine the subject vehicle's past location(s) through the analysis of stored ALPR data. The legitimate law enforcement purpose will be affirmed with the use an ICR number. Examples of legitimate and specific reasons for adding a license plate or partial license plate to a BOLO list include, but are not limited to: Rochester Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 4 (a)Persons who are subject to an outstanding arrest warrant (b)Missing persons (c)Amber or Silver Alerts (d)Stolen vehicles (e)Vehicles that are reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of a crime (f)Vehicles that are registered to or are reasonably believed to be operated by persons who do not have a valid operator's license or who are on the revoked or suspended list (g)Persons who are subject to a restraining order or curfew issued by a court or by the Parole Board, or who are subject to any other duly issued order restricting their movements (h)Persons wanted by a law enforcement agency who are of interest in a specific investigation, whether or not such persons are themselves suspected of criminal activity (i)Persons who are on any watch list issued by a State or federal agency responsible for homeland security Hotlist information may be downloaded in batch form from other databases, including but not limited to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), National Insurance Crime Bureau, United States Department of Homeland Security, and Motor Vehicle Commission database. A Hot list may be revised at any time necessitating frequent updates. For a mobile ALPR, updates to the Hotlist shall be made at the start of each shift. A stationary ALPR positioned at a fixed location shall be updated as frequently as practicable, but no less than on a daily basis. Officers alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is on the Hot list may be required to make a reasonable effort to determine if a lawful basis to stop the vehicle exists. An officer reacting to an alert shall consult the database to determine the reason why the vehicle had been placed on the Hot list and whether the alert has been designated as a non-encounter alert. In the event of a non-encounter alert, the officer shall follow any instructions included in the alert for notifying the law enforcement or homeland security agency that had put out the BOLO. See attachment: ALPR Procedure.pdf 427.6 ACCOUNTABILITY All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Rochester Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Minn. Stat. § 13.824; Minn. Stat. § 13.05): (a)All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time. (b)Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data Rochester Police Department Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 5 relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action. (c)Biennial audits and reports shall be completed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 13.824, Subd. 6. (d)Breaches of personal data are addressed as set forth in the Protected Information Policy (Minn. Stat. § 13.055). (e)All queries and responses, and all actions, in which data are entered, updated, accessed, shared or disseminated, must be recorded in a data audit trail. (f)Any member who violates Minn. Stat. § 13.09 through the unauthorized acquisition or use of ALPR data will face discipline and possible criminal prosecution (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). 427.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes: 1.The name of the agency. 2.The name of the person requesting. 3.The intended purpose of obtaining the information. 4.A record of the factual basis for the access and any associated case number, complaint or incident that is the basis for the access. 5.A statement that the request is authorized by the head of the requesting law enforcement agency or his/her designee. (b)The request is reviewed by the Services Captain or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled. 1.A release must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the data is pertinent to an active criminal investigation. (c)The approved request is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy. All data collected by ALPR’s is classified as private data on individuals, until it is determined that the data should be classified as public data by the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Policy Manual Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department Attachments - 6 Attachments Attachment Policy Manual Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2024/01/09, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by Rochester Police Department ALPR Procedure.pdf - 7 ALPR Procedure.pdf ALPR Procedure.pdf 427.5.2 ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT ALPR HOTLIST PROCEDURE A. This procedure has been established to ensure proper accountability of the RPD ALPR Hotlist. B. All Officers/Staff using ALPR must complete policy acknowledgement and training prior to use. C. All Officers are able to make additions/deletions to the RPD ALPR Hotlist. It is imperative that the RPD ALPR Hotlist only contain valid and current records. D. Procedure for ALPR list entry: 1. Officer/Staff determine if they have proper vehicle information available and have satisfied the established ALPR Hotlist entry criteria. 2. Officers/Staff shall inform their supervisor of their intention to include a record on the RPD ALPR hotlist. 3. Officers/Staff enter license plate record using the evidence.com hotlist records management. 4. Officers/Staff include the associated ICR# along with the subject and reason for entry in the “NOTE” box when creating a new record. Example: 2023-99999999 John Jacob Doe DOB 4/4/88 PC arrest for Domestic Assault. 5. All RPD ALPR Hotlist entries shall be properly categorized and receive “HIGH” priority. 6. Officers/Staff shall inform all Police Sworn Officers of the entry to the ALPR Hotlist via email using the special information bulletin email template. E. Procedure for BOLO list removal and documentation: 1. Officers/Staff delete license plate records using evidence.com hotlist records management. 2. An Officer that takes action after being alerted by an ALPR hit is required to ensure that the record is deleted once it is no longer valid. 3. Officers/Staff shall convert the ALPR Hit record to evidence in evidence.com. F. An ALPR Records search may be executed by all department personnel that have the appropriate evidence.com access and a valid law enforcement purpose. Associated RPD ICR#’s are required for each search. G. Procedure for ALPR Records search. 1. Enter full/partial license plate information in the plate number field of evidence.com. 2. Include appropriate search criteria. 3. Include RPD (or appropriate agency) ICR# in the search reason box. H. All Officers are required to ensure that records included on the hotlists (RPD and NCIC) are valid prior to taking enforcement action. I. The RPD APLR Hotlist is managed managed by the RPD Intelligence and Crime Analysis Unit. In addition, Patrol Supervisors shall ensure that the RPD ALPR Hotlist is valid and current on a daily basis. Help your city reduce crime with cameras that see like a detective Flock Safety provides an affordable, infrastructure-free automatic license plate reading (ALPR) camera system for cities who want to reduce crime within a principled framework. Unlike traditional ALPR, Flock uses Vehicle Fingerprint™ technology to transform hours of footage into a searchable database to find the single piece of evidence needed, even when a license plate isn't visible. Not your average security cameras Infrastructure-Free and Discreet Design With solar power and LTE connectivity, we can install the devices almost anywhere. And the beautiful design means it will blend in with your city’s aesthetic. Safety-as-a-Service We install and maintain the devices, so you can focus on running the city. That means we will support you from procurement, through permitting, and even preparing you to present this project to the city council. Vehicle Fingerprint Technology Your officers can find vehicle evidence by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, missing and covered plates, and other unique features like bumper stickers, decals, and roof racks. “Flock Safety made my job easy. The system was up and running in just a few weeks, and has proven to help our police department find the evidence to solve more crime.” City Manager in Ohio Attachment Item: 2h. Join 2500+ cities using Flock Safety to eliminate crime “Flock Safety continues to enhance and help our police department capture these vehicles and return the assets to their owners." -Council member Josh McCurn of Lexington, KY Public Safety Technology Built with Principles You own the footage We won’t share it or sell it. It’s 100% yours for your law enforcement to use to solve crime. 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Policy 425 West Hennepin Public Safety West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) 425.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). 425.2 ADMINISTRATION The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the West Hennepin Public Safety to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery. All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Administration Sergeant. The Administration Sergeant will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. 425.3 OPERATIONS Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose. (a)An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b)An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not necessary before using an ALPR. (c)While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. (d)No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training. (e)No ALPR operator may access confidential department, state or federal data unless authorized to do so. (f)If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the Minnesota Justice Information Services (MNJIS) and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) databases before taking enforcement action that is based solely upon an ALPR alert. Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/12/21, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by West Hennepin Public Safety Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 337 Attachment Item: 2i. West Hennepin Public Safety West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) 425.3.1 RESTRICTIONS, NOTIFICATIONS AND AUDITS The West Hennepin Public Safety will observe the following guidelines regarding ALPR use (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Data collected by an ALPR will be limited to: 1.License plate numbers. 2.Date, time and location of data captured. 3.Pictures of license plates, vehicles and areas surrounding the vehicle captured. (b)ALPR data may only be matched with the Minnesota license plate data file, unless additional sources are needed for an active criminal investigation. (c)ALPRs shall not be used to monitor or track an individual unless done so under a search warrant or because of exigent circumstances. (d)The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shall be notified within 10 days of any installation or use and of any fixed location of an ALPR. 425.4 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION The Administration Sergeant is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. ALPR data received from another agency shall be maintained securely and released in the same manner as ALPR data collected by this department (Minn. Stat. § 13.824). ALPR data not related to an active criminal investigation must be destroyed no later than 60 days from the date of collection with the following exceptions (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Exculpatory evidence - Data must be retained until a criminal matter is resolved if a written request is made from a person who is the subject of a criminal investigation asserting that ALPR data may be used as exculpatory evidence. (b)Address Confidentiality Program - Data related to a participant of the Address Confidentiality Program must be destroyed upon the written request of the participant. ALPR data already collected at the time of the request shall be destroyed and future related ALPR data must be destroyed at the time of collection. Destruction can be deferred if it relates to an active criminal investigation. All other ALPR data should be retained in accordance with the established records retention schedule. 425.4.1 LOG OF USE A public log of ALPR use will be maintained that includes (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)Specific times of day that the ALPR collected data. (b)The aggregate number of vehicles or license plates on which data are collected for each period of active use and a list of all state and federal public databases with which the data were compared. Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/12/21, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by West Hennepin Public Safety Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 338 West Hennepin Public Safety West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) (c)For each period of active use, the number of vehicles or license plates related to: 1.A vehicle or license plate that has been stolen. 2.A warrant for the arrest of the owner of the vehicle. 3.An owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license or similar category. 4.Active investigative data. (d)For an ALPR at a stationary or fixed location, the location at which the ALPR actively collected data and is installed and used. A publicly accessible list of the current and previous locations, including dates at those locations, of any fixed ALPR or other surveillance devices with ALPR capability shall be maintained. The list may be kept from the public if the data is security information as provided in Minn. Stat. § 13.37, Subd. 2. 425.5 ACCOUNTABILITY All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The West Hennepin Public Safety will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Minn. Stat. § 13.824; Minn. Stat. § 13.05): (a)All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time. (b)Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action. (c)Biennial audits and reports shall be completed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 13.824, Subd. 6. (d)Breaches of personal data are addressed as set forth in the Protected Information Policy (Minn. Stat. § 13.055). (e)All queries and responses, and all actions, in which data are entered, updated, accessed, shared or disseminated, must be recorded in a data audit trail. (f)Any member who violates Minn. Stat. § 13.09 through the unauthorized acquisition or use of ALPR data will face discipline and possible criminal prosecution (Minn. Stat. § 626.8472). 425.6 POLICY The policy of the West Hennepin Public Safety is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review. Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/12/21, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by West Hennepin Public Safety Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 339 West Hennepin Public Safety West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual West Hennepin PSD Policy Manual Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) 425.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures (Minn. Stat. § 13.824): (a)The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes: 1.The name of the agency. 2.The name of the person requesting. 3.The intended purpose of obtaining the information. 4.A record of the factual basis for the access and any associated case number, complaint or incident that is the basis for the access. 5.A statement that the request is authorized by the head of the requesting law enforcement agency or his/her designee. (b)The request is reviewed by the Administration Sergeant or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled. 1.A release must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the data is pertinent to an active criminal investigation. (c)The approved request is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy. Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/12/21, All Rights Reserved. Published with permission by West Hennepin Public Safety Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) - 340 From:Jay Tobin To:Tom McKee; Michelle Friedrich Cc:Matt Gottschalk Subject:Fwd: Plate camera letter from commissioner Date:Sunday, February 4, 2024 5:41:11 PM Attachments:APLRs city of Corcoran.pdf Michelle- Please add the attached letter to the work session packet. Thanks- Jay Jay Tobin City Administrator City of Corcoran 8200 County Road 116 | Corcoran, MN 55340 Office: 763-400-7030 Added Agenda Attachment Item: 2j. With all humility, I share the minimal research that I have done into the matter of automatic license plate readers. I do hope that this is coming to you with adequate time prior to the upcoming work session so that the information can be vetted and considered. I had to rereview the information because it had been a while since I first compiled the information; my apologies for not sending it earlier. Bear in mind that I am a citizen and not trained legally so offer grace where needed because the communication of ideas or citations do not come in the typical language of a trained professional. The two main issues that I will focus my arguments on are the constitutional protection of the 4th amendment and the violation of privacy. The court cases that I have reviewed are Commonwealth v. McCarthy, United States v. Katz and United States v. Antoine Jones. Links to each case review are cited at the end. The Bill of Rights is a document meant to protect the citizens of the United States of America from an overreaching (well-intended or not) government. On December 20, 1787, Thomas Jefferson said, “[A] bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse.” The 4th amendment in particular states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by the oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The fact that Automatic License Plate Readers (from here out to be referred to as APLR) collect and store data on the whereabouts and movements of individuals prior to any individual coming under suspicion yet can be retrieved and utilized after such a time is in effect operating under the mindset that everyone is always under suspicion when out in public. While I do not argue that a license plate is generally protected, the act of collecting data through surveillance could create a picture of someone’s daily life and be akin to a violation of privacy. The case of the Commonwealth v. McCarthy was a case where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the use of ALPRs may constitute a search; however, in reading through the analysis of the case it identifies practical realities of ALPRs that should cause more constitutional scrutiny before implementing. Too often in history, we have agreed to the use of an advancement with the thought of its benefit or perceived gain whilst sweeping away concerns with the sentiment that the courts will sort it out later. Engaging in critical thought and review around three issues (not exhaustive but included below) raised in the review of aforementioned case should be considered during this work session. “First, ALPRs may threaten reasonable expectations of privacy in their potentially indefinite duration of data collection and retention. GPS and CSLI data are typically obtained by law enforcement post hoc, for relatively limited time periods, and, for CSLI, with a relatively short data retention period. ALPRs can send real-time alerts with contemporaneous location information, collected automatically and recurrently; and they can cover both prospective and retrospective periods, spanning back for potentially years, if not decades. The ALPR database in McCarthy was owned and operated by Massachusetts state agencies, with a one-year data retention policy for historical data. While the government’s own ALPR cameras may include procedural safeguards — including transparency requirements, data retention limitations, and other democratically approved policies — those of the private sector may not. Critically, when private-sector ALPR companies collect and store ALPR data indefinitely, that information may become available to contracting law enforcement agencies that subscribe to these less rights-protective databases. To the extent that courts have ruled it “objectively reasonable . . . to expect to be free from sustained electronic monitoring” of the whole of one’s public Added Agenda Attachment Item: 2j. movements, law enforcement’s access to indefinite (and theoretically infinite), retroactive, contemporaneous, and prospective location data may indeed represent the “dragnet-type” law enforcement that the McCarthy court feared.” “Second, the surreptitiousness of ALPR technology may likewise extend beyond that identified by the McCarthy court, again owing to ALPR databases’ mutually constitutive public-private nature. One illustrative example concerns Vaas International Holdings, Inc. (Vaas), a private corporation whose networks aggregate scans from ALPR cameras stationed across the country into extensive ALPR databases. Law enforcement agencies can subscribe to one of Vaas’s networks, Vigilant Solutions, which is among the nation’s largest ALPR vendors. Vigilant Solutions sells to police departments access to a database containing over five billion ALPR scans collected nationwide, about 1.5 billion of which originate from other law enforcement agencies. This “creates a revolving door of license plate scans from law enforcement to Vigilant Solutions back to law enforcement agencies.” Problems of surreptitiousness that arise from this contractual system extend beyond the public’s probable lack of knowledge as to its workings or its existence. First, transparency and procedural safeguards (e.g., data retention limitations) may be lacking altogether in private vendors’ ALPR databases. Second, vendor contracts with private ALPR companies may prohibit law enforcement from disclosing to the public their use of the ALPR surveillance systems’ private databases, even if they wanted to. ALPRs differ in this way from GPS devices, which must be physically placed onto targets’ persons, vehicles, or belongings, and CSLI, which generally must be obtained from targets’ cell phone companies via warrants. ALPRs, however, can surreptitiously collect and distribute an untold aggregation of individuals’ location data — not only over a potentially indefinite duration, but also across the country, in ways likely unknown to the general public. Traditional surveillance could not furtively obtain such a wide breadth of information, heightening constitutional privacy concerns further still.” “However, the integration of ALPR data across government agencies and the private sector underscores not only the unprecedented durational categories of information that ALPRs reveal, but also the tools’ cross-jurisdictional information-sharing consequences. In McCarthy, a state agency managed the ALPR databases for cameras owned and operated by the state police. But a major constitutional implication of the categories-of-information factor arises from the aforementioned practical integration of government agencies’ local ALPR systems with those of the national private sector. While one unique category of information exposed by ALPRs concerns law enforcement’s newfound ability to “travel back in time,” the public-private nature of ALPRs extends this duration to a potentially indefinite, nationwide, cross-jurisdictional scale. Recordation and aggregation on such a wide scale may enable the government “to ascertain, more or less at will, [individuals’] political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on” — the exact “dragnet” surveillance feared by the McCarthy court. Of constitutional import, the scale of information uncovered by such sweeping surveillance may reveal “a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but . . . of our associations — political, religious, amicable and amorous . . . — [and] the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.” Further, “the only way to opt out of [ALPR] surveillance is to avoid the impacted area, which may pose significant hardships and be . . . unrealistic.” Though this scaling consequence was not implicated by the facts of McCarthy, it is nonetheless germane when analyzing ALPRs under the Katz–Jones–Carpenter framework going forward.” Harvard Law Review, 2021 In the case of United States v. Antoine Jones, it highlights how much the Supreme Court has struggled to reach a doctrine of consensus that adequately protects Fourth Amendment rights amidst the technological advancements of our day. For the past four decades, Justice Harlan’s test from Katz v. United States, which defines a “search” as government conduct that violates a “reasonable expectation of privacy” has been used. With regards to this specific case, a GPS tracking device was attached to a person’s vehicle by the FBI for 28 concurrent days; however, the Justices’ opinions in this specific case do make reference to the broader use of surveillance and other types of devices. “Justice Sotomayor concurred. She agreed with Justice Scalia’s “irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.” She argued that relying on Katz, instead of trespass, “erodes that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent in items of property.” She rested on the “narrower” trespassory analysis, joining Justice Scalia to form a majority. Justice Sotomayor also recognized that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance” and suspected that “the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance” in the future. Accordingly, she offered her view that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” Going further than Justice Alito, she hypothesized that “even short-term monitoring” demands “particular attention”: GPS surveillance provides a “wealth of detail” about intimate associations while “evad[ing] the ordinary checks [like the high cost of traditional surveillance] that constrain abusive law enforcement practices.” Justice Sotomayor would even “reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” because disclosure is necessary for “mundane tasks” in “the digital age.” The last time I voiced concerns about ALPRs during public comment at a City Council meeting, one of the councilmember’s implied through their statement that since most citizens carry cell phones with GPS and tracking technology, it negates a need to weigh the constitutionality of the use of APLRs. I beg to differ. Citizens have the choice to leave their cell phones or not to own one. The citizens have entered into a contract with the cell phone company of their own volition. The degree to which an individual citizen may guard themselves from tracking technology or data storage through their device depends on the individual, arguably the citizen has a role to play in what information is kept or tracked even if it is just seemingly so. ALPRs would be owned by the department of public safety, an entity of the governing body. The citizens would not have access to its information or systems even if just to verify the legal perimeters of their use are being followed. The only way to opt-out of APLRs is to avoid the area where they are used. If the city chooses to move forward with implementation, will it be publicly known where the APLRs are used? Our government is founded on the idea of checks and balances between the areas of the government as well as between the citizens and their government. What is the balance of power protecting citizens from drag-net type surveillance? What safety is being gained by the restraint of the liberty of privacy? Is it an actual safety or a perception of safety? It must be said that I am mournful when laws are broken and I long for justice. I appreciate the job our public safety officers do and the risk they put themselves in. I sympathize with the difficult balance of protecting the public and protecting the unalienable rights all humans are endowed with. The Bill of Rights did not grant these, it was created to protect them. All the bloodshed throughout the history of our own nation, all the wrong done to the those the Bill of Rights was supposed to protect, all the sacrifice given to defend these rights should be honored by giving scrupulous, thoughtful, consideration and review to this issue. Harvard Law Review, June 10, 2021, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, https://harvardlawreview.org https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-134/commonwealth-v-mccarthy/ The Supreme Court Leading Cases, (2012). Harvard Law Review [Vol. 126:176 2012], 226-236. https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/vol126_united_states_v_jones.pdf Lynch, J., May 5, 2020, Courts Issue Rulings in Two Cases Challenging Law Enforcement Searches of License Plate Databases, https://www.eff.org https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/courts-issue-rulings-two-cases-challenging-law-enforcement- searches-license-plate This message was sent from outside of the organization. Please do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the source of this email and know the content is safe. From:Jay Tobin To:Michelle Friedrich Subject:Fwd: Comments re: ALPRs Date:Thursday, February 8, 2024 10:13:36 AM Attachments:MTL Letter to City Council re ALPRs.pdf FYI Jay Tobin City Administrator City of Corcoran 8200 County Road 116 | Corcoran, MN 55340 Office: 763-400-7030 From: Mark Lanterman <mlanterman@compforensics.com> Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2024 11:35:41 AM To: Tom McKee <tmckee@corcoranmn.gov>; Jonathan Bottema <jbottema@corcoranmn.gov>; Natalie Davis <ndavis@corcoranmn.gov>; 'John Thames' <john.thames@carsoncs.net>; Jeremy Nichols <jnichols@corcoranmn.gov>; Dean Vehrenkamp <dvehrenkamp@corcoranmn.gov>; Jay Tobin <jtobin@corcoranmn.gov>; Alan Schultz <ASchultz@corcoranmn.gov>; Pete Ekenberg <pekenberg@corcoranmn.gov>; Matt Gottschalk <mgottschalk@corcoranmn.gov> Subject: Comments re: ALPRs Dear Mayor McKee and Corcoran City Council Members, I have attached a letter for your review. Best regards, Mark LantermanChair, Corcoran Planning Commission Mark LantermanChief Technology OfficerComputerForensic Services800 Hennepin Avenue, 5th FloorMinneapolis, MN 55403952-924-9920 officemlanterman@compforensics.comwww.compforensics.com Added Agenda Attachment Item: 2k. February 7, 2024 Via Email to City Administrator The Honorable Thomas McKee, Mayor of Corcoran, Members of the Corcoran City Council Corcoran City Hall 8200 County Road 116 Corcoran, MN 55340 Re: Automatic license plate readers Dear Mayor McKee, and Members of the Corcoran City Council, This letter is intended to briefly relay my commentary about automatic license plate readers (“ALPRs”), that are proposed to be installed at various locations within Corcoran’s city limits. To preface this issue, I recognize the value of ALPRs to public safety. More broadly, I understand that law enforcement, like any other organization, should be afforded the ability to take advantage of new technologies. Particularly, in today’s environment, such technology will be a valuable tool to not only law enforcement, but the victims of crime. Notwithstanding this fact, it is nevertheless important to consider the impacts on Corcoran citizens’ constitutional right to privacy, as well as survey state law related to the use of ALPRs. First, on its face, this proposal would seem that only law enforcement would receive the data yielded by the camera systems. I think it is important for the City to recognize that this is not true. (See Flock Safety’s Government Agency Customer Agreement, “For clarity, Flock may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the [ALPR] Footage to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties”). In short, Flock appears to make money from selling access to the data collected by its camera network. (See Smith v. Flock Safety, 5:23-CV-02198, (N.D. Ohio)).1 The collected data is not limited to just license plate information that has some connection to a crime; it is data about all license plate information (and, necessarily, related location and time data) that is captured by the cameras, including those of ordinary, law-abiding citizens. 1 I note that the Smith v. Flock Safety case involved a driver who was arrested after a license plate reader, operated by Flock Safety, misidentified his vehicle's license plate. It emphasizes the need for stringent oversight, transparent policies, and robust safeguards to protect against false positives and ensure the privacy and rights of our citizens are not inadvertently compromised. Added Agenda Attachment: 2k. Secondly, I respectfully urge a thorough review by the City's legal counsel of state legislation regarding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). State law stipulates that data from ALPRs not associated with ongoing criminal investigations cannot be disseminated, sold, or exchanged with any parties unless such actions are expressly permitted by law or specific legal provisions (see Minn. Stat. § 13.824 subd. 4(c)) Moreover, the legislation mandates that ALPRs cannot be utilized to surveil or trace individuals under active criminal investigation without proper judicial authorization through a warrant based on probable cause, or in situations where exigent circumstances necessitate usage without a warrant (Minn. Stat. § 13.824 subd. 2(d)). Given these regulations, it appears that Flock Safety's operations—namely, the sale of access to data collected via its camera network—may contravene state law. In order to effectively balance the City’s interest in public safety with such privacy concerns, I request careful consideration of at least two (2) terms in Flock’s contract: 1) Flock’s data retention period for ALPR data (how long that location/license plate data is kept and can be searched), and 2) Flock’s ability to share data with third parties and other law enforcement agencies outside of Corcoran. Please feel free to contact me should you wish to discuss, more specifically, the reasoning for such changes. While this letter does not, and is not intended to convey every fact or law relevant to the proposed use of ALPRs, I have simply included enough to generally outline my concern. I look forward to a thoughtful discussion on this matter and am eager to contribute to a solution that is balanced to provide benefits to public safety while also limiting the risks to privacy. I sincerely appreciate the Council’s and staff’s service to the residents of our city, and your consideration and time addressing my comments and concerns. Sincerely, Mark Lanterman Chair, Corcoran Planning Commission 6936 Oak Ridge Road, Corcoran